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RACISM, JURIES, AND JUSTICE: ADDRESSING 
POST-VERDICT JUROR TESTIMONY OF RACIAL 
PREJUDICE DURING DELIBERATIONS 
Andrew C. Helman* 
“There is little doubt that postverdict [sic] investigation into juror misconduct 
would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after 
irresponsible or improper juror behavior.  It is not at all clear, however, that the 
jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.” – Justice O’Connor.1 
 
“Petitioners are not asking for a perfect jury.  They are seeking to determine 
whether the jury that heard their case behaved in a manner consonant with the 
minimum requirements of the Sixth Amendment.  If we deny them this 
opportunity, the jury system may survive, but the constitutional guarantee on 
which it is based will become meaningless.” – Justice Marshall.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  A Tale of Two Juries 
From the beginning, race played a role in the prosecution of Christopher 
McCowen for the rape and murder of well-known fashion writer Christa 
Worthington.3  To some, the trial was even a spectacle and treated as “one of the 
most spectacular homicide cases in [Massachusetts’] history.”4  It quickly became a 
“made-for-cable-news tale of the heiress fashion writer and her lowly Portuguese 
fisherman lover, illicit sex, and an out-of-wedlock child,” all set in a seaside 
village.5  McCowen, an African-American garbage man, was right in the middle of 
it; police and prosecutors did not believe his assertions that he had consensual sex 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Maine School of Law.  I would first like to thank my wife 
Sara for supporting me in every way imaginable.  In addition, many thanks to Professor Melvyn Zarr, 
Professor Christopher Knott, and Hon. Andrew M. Horton.  All mistakes, of course, are my own.  
Additionally, I would like to point out a few limitations of this Comment.  First, the Comment 
primarily focuses on criminal trials because of the constitutional protections of the Sixth Amendment. 
However, I think the same basic fairness arguments should apply in a civil context.  Second, this Article 
is limited in its scope to racial prejudice because of the extent of scholarship, available case law, and 
incremental way the law moves forward.  However, I think all the arguments presented here are equally 
as persuasive with other forms of prejudice-whether based on ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual 
orientation.  Third, largely absent from this Article is a substantial discussion of the standards a court 
should use once it has decided to take evidence from a juror.  It deserves more discussion than could be 
provided here.  
 1. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987). 
 2. Id. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 3. Jonathan Saltzman, Jury in Cape Murder Ordered Back to Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 
2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/11/30/jury_in_cape_murder_ 
ordered_back_to_court/.  
 4. Peter Manso, An Unjust Conclusion, BOSTON MAGAZINE, March 2007, available at 
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/articles/an_unjust_conclusion/. 
 5. Id. 
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with Worthington and that someone else killed her.6  And after eight days of 
deliberations, it appeared that jurors also did not believe McCowen’s defense.7  
They convicted him of Worthington’s rape and murder.8  Arguably, for some legal 
experts and scholars, that is where the story started to get more interesting. 
A few days after the deliberations, three jurors contacted McCowen’s lawyer 
and said that racial prejudice tainted the deliberations and that at least one juror felt 
pressure to convict.9  The three jurors alleged that a white juror “used the term 
‘black man’ in a racist manner,” that another white juror “told fellow jurors she 
feared McCowen because he was a black man staring at her,” and that a Cape 
Verdean juror said “blacks had a tendency toward violence.”10  Based on the jurors’ 
affidavits, McCowen’s lawyer filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, among other 
things, that racial prejudice denied McCowen a fair trial.11  
Similar to Maine and the federal courts, Massachusetts’ evidentiary guidelines 
bar jury testimony to impeach a verdict, except for evidence of extraneous 
prejudicial information or outside influences.12  There is disagreement among 
courts and scholars as to whether evidence of racial prejudice during deliberations 
is considered to be barred by the rule, within an exception to the rule, or whether 
racially prejudiced statements present constitutional problems to which the rule 
must give way.13  In Massachusetts, however, juror testimony to prove that racial 
prejudice tainted deliberations is allowed because doing otherwise “might well 
offend fundamental fairness.”14  In practice, however, only a few jurors had ever 
been recalled at one time.15 
                                                                                                     
 6. Saltzman, supra note 3. 
 7. Manso, supra note 4. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Mary Ann Bragg, McCowen-Jury Racial Bias Hearing Continues, CAPE COD TIMES, Jan. 19, 
2008. 
 11. Manso, supra note 4.  The motion for new trial was subsequently denied and an appeal is 
pending. Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Rules No New Trial in Slaying of Writer, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 
2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/04/05/judge_rules_ no_new_ trial_ 
in_slaying_of_writer/. 
 12. Massachusetts has yet to formally adopt rules of evidence; however, it has put together an 
evidentiary guide that reads like a set of rules.  For more information, go to 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/guide-to-evidence/introduction.htm.  The Massachusetts guide says the 
following:  
(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment.  Upon an inquiry into the validity of a 
verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any 
other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection 
therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.  Nor may a juror’s affidavit or 
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would 
be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. 
 13. See infra Parts II, III. 
 14. Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Tavares, 430 N.E.2d 1198 (Mass. 1982)). 
 15. David E. Frank, “Unprecedented” Public Hearing on Alleged Juror Bias to Get Under Way in 
Mass. Superior Court, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 7, 2008. 
330 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
As a result, many in the legal community were surprised when the trial court 
responded to McCowen’s motion for a new trial by recalling the entire jury to 
testify in open court.16  A former Massachusetts prosecutor and specialist on juries 
said, “I have not come across such a case,” though he did acknowledge that judges 
in Massachusetts will occasionally question jurors in private.17  One Massachusetts 
judge laid out the policy dilemma succinctly: “We’re all against racial bias, but 
how far can you trace it in the system without invading equally important public 
policy questions like the freedom of the jury to discuss the case?”18  
In contrast to Massachusetts, the Tenth Circuit does not allow jurors to testify 
to show whether racial prejudice infected deliberations, though that does not mean 
deliberations are free from racial prejudice.19  For example, one day after a jury 
convicted a member of the Ute Mountain Ute tribe of forcibly assaulting a Bureau 
of Indian Affairs officer with a dangerous weapon, a juror alleged that deliberations 
had been tainted by racial prejudice against Native Americans.20  The juror alleged, 
for example, that during deliberations the foreman had claimed that Native 
Americans who drink alcohol become drunk and violent.21  Additionally, the juror 
alleged that that some jurors said they needed to “send a message back to the 
reservation.”22  However, the Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s arguments in 
support of a new trial and concluded that Rule 606(b) was a total bar to all juror 
evidence that would impact the verdict.23  
Here in Maine, the law on juror testimony is not entirely clear.  Trial courts 
have ample authority to allow post-verdict juror testimony in some instances,24 but 
the right case has not yet emerged to test the law on testimony to prove racial 
prejudice tainted deliberations.  Accordingly, this article will explore whether the 
rule pits process values against notions of fairness; whether Maine trial judges have 
the authority to admit juror testimony in some instances; and whether it is possible 
to do so without undermining important process values, both before and after the 
verdict.  
The rest of Part I will provide an overview of the problem, showing why the 
general rule against post-verdict juror testimony presents a problem in the limited 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. 
 17. Saltzman, supra note 3. 
 18. Id. 
 19. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008), reh’g denied en banc, 560 F.3d 
1151, petition for cert. filed (July 20, 2009) (No. 09-5429).  But see United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76 
(1st Cir. 2009). In Villar, the court concluded that trial judges have “the discretion to inquire into the 
validity of the verdict by hearing juror testimony to determine whether ethnically biased statements were 
made during jury deliberations and, if so, whether there is a substantial probability that any such 
comments made a difference in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 87. The court believed “that the rule 
against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony in those rare and 
grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a defendant’s right 
to due process and an impartial jury.” Id. 
 20. Id. at 1231. 
 21. Id. at 1231-32. 
 22. Id. at 1232. 
 23. Id. at 1231. 
 24. See Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 9-6 at 9-12 to 9-14 (4th ed. 2009); State v. 
Chesnel, 1999 ME 120, ¶¶ 14-31, 734 A.2d 1131, 1136-41; State v. Watts, 2006 ME 109, ¶¶ 15-21, 907 
A.2d 147, 150-52. 
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instance where racial prejudice appears to have tainted jury deliberations.  Part II 
will show that the federal courts are unable to offer any guidance because of a split 
between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits on how to apply federal Rule 606(b), which 
is substantially the same as the Maine rule.  Part III will consider Maine’s law in 
this area, including whether there are steps that can be taken earlier in the process 
to avoid confronting Rule 606(b), while also considering four arguments in support 
of allowing juror testimony after the verdict has been returned.  However, Part IV 
provides a better approach, suggesting an amendment to Maine’s Rule 606(b) that 
would expressly allow judges to consider when and how to tackle post-verdict 
allegations that racial prejudice tainted deliberations. 
B.  Overview of the Problem 
Allegations of racial prejudice during jury deliberations raise significant 
problems.  On one hand, there are many sound policies underlying secret jury 
deliberations: stability of verdicts, finality of judgments, ensuring deliberations are 
secret, protecting jurors from harassment by disappointed litigants, and preventing 
jurors with second thoughts from trying to upset the verdict.25  On the other hand, 
racial prejudice arguably offends notions of fairness, undermines confidence in the 
judicial system, results in decisions not based on the facts, and threatens a 
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury trial.  As a result, the challenge for the 
courts “is to find the means of guaranteeing . . . impartiality, without so crippling or 
altering the institution of the jury as to deny the . . . right to be tried by a jury.”26 
The Supreme Court faced a similar balancing dilemma in Tanner v. United 
States, a case where jurors allegedly became intoxicated from drugs and alcohol to 
the point that they were falling asleep and the trial became “one big party.”27  Not 
only were jurors allegedly using marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol throughout the 
trial and deliberations, but they also were allegedly selling drugs to each other.28 At 
least one juror reported that he was “flying” during portions of the trial.29  As a 
result, the juror became so concerned after the verdict that he contacted defense 
counsel “to clear [his] conscience . . . [b]ecause [he] felt . . . that the people on the 
jury didn’t have no business being on the jury.  [He] felt Mr. Tanner should have a 
better opportunity to get somebody that would review the facts right.”30 
The Court considered and rejected several arguments for the admissibility of 
juror testimony.  First, the Court concluded an exception for outside influences did 
not apply because voluntarily ingested drugs and alcohol are “no more an ‘outside 
influence’ than a virus, poorly prepared food, or lack of sleep.”31  Second, the 
Court concluded that the legislative history showed that Congress considered and 
rejected a proposed rule that would have allowed this sort of testimony, so the 
Court could not find a retained exception at common law.32  Third, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 25. Patterson v. Rossingol, 245 A.2d 852, 857 (Me. 1968). 
 26. State v. Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d 686 (Wis. 1984).  
 27. 483 U.S. 107, 115 (1987). 
 28. Id. at 115-16. 
 29. Id. at 116. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 122. 
 32. Id. 
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concluded that the defendants were not denied a constitutionally fair trial under the 
Sixth Amendment because this right is protected at several earlier places in the trial 
process: during voir dire, in-court observations, and post-verdict hearings based on 
non-juror testimony.33  While Justice O’Connor acknowledged that post-verdict 
inquiries would certainly reveal some irregularities probably warranting a new trial, 
“[i]t is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts to 
perfect it.”34  
However, Tanner is not without its critics. For example, in dissent, Justice 
Marshall reached the opposite conclusion.35  While he agreed with Justice 
O’Connor that perfection cannot be the goal, he said the courts should “determine 
whether the jury that heard [the] case behaved in a manner consonant with the 
minimum requirements of the Sixth Amendment.  If we deny them this 
opportunity, the jury system may survive, but the constitutional guarantee on which 
it is based will become meaningless.”36  Additionally, while Justice O’Connor cited 
Wigmore’s treatise on evidence for the proposition that the rule “flatly” barring 
juror testimony gained “near-universal” adherence,37 a closer reading of Wigmore 
supports Justice Marshall’s dissent because Wigmore expressly stated that jurors 
should be able to testify to show they were intoxicated.38  However, like Justice 
O’Connor, many courts simply rely on “the shibboleth that ‘a juror cannot impeach 
his verdict.’”39 
While Tanner played a pivotal role in the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that juror 
testimony is barred, anecdotal evidence, recent court decisions, and social science 
research raise serious questions about the logical inference to draw from the 
majority opinion in Tanner—that the jury system cannot function if juror testimony 
to prove racial prejudice is allowed—and the Court’s conclusion that Sixth 
Amendment rights are adequately protected earlier in the trial process.  For 
example, as part of a recent symposium, Hon. Janet Bond Arterton, U.S. District 
Judge for the District of Connecticut, shared a few anecdotes that shed light on the 
challenges judges face when trying to ensure that juries are free from prejudice.40  
She recounted a letter from an anonymous white juror, who was on a panel that 
delivered a verdict against three black plaintiffs in a civil rights case.41  The letter 
said: 
During deliberations, matter-of-fact expressions of bigotry and broad-brush 
platitudes about “those people” rolled off the tongues of a vocal majority as 
naturally and unabashedly as if they were discussing the weather.  Shocked and 
sickened, I sat silently, rationalizing to myself that since I did agree with the 
product, there was nothing to be gained by speaking out against the process (I now 
                                                                                                     
 33. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127. 
 34. Id. at 120. 
 35. See generally id. at 134  (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 142. 
 37. Id. at 117 (majority opinion) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 2349 at 681-82, 690 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961) (1904)). 
 38. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2349 at 681-82, 690. 
 39. Id. at 690. 
 40. Hon. Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 
1023 (2008). 
 41. Id. at 1032. 
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regret my inaction).42 
Had the case been focused on a “fine distinction or subtle nuances—a more diverse 
jury might have made a material difference in the outcome.”43 
Additionally, Judge Arterton occasionally points out the defendant’s race 
during jury selection and asks if it would impact any juror’s deliberations; in two 
instances, jurors said it “might.”44  Judge Arterton was not entirely certain whether 
the jurors just wanted out of jury service, which left her with a larger question:45  
How can judges expect to get honest answers about whether jurors harbor racial or 
ethnic prejudices, “particularly where an honest response about one’s operative 
biases requires conscious insight into one’s unconscious?”46  
Despite efforts to ensure fair trials by Tanner’s methods, recent cases show 
that racial prejudice is still appearing as a post-verdict issue.  For example, in 
Washington State, a trial judge recently granted a motion for a new trial based on 
juror affidavits of racial and ethnic prejudice towards the defendant’s lawyer, who 
was of Japanese ancestry.47  The judge concluded the jurors’ affidavits tended to 
show jurors intentionally referred to the lawyer, Mark D. Kamitomo, as “Mr. 
Kamikaze,” “Mr. Miyashi,” or “Mr. Miyagi,” though the jurors later claimed they 
did so because they had difficulty pronouncing his name.48  Additionally, the court 
found that at least one juror said the plaintiff’s verdict was “almost appropriate” 
because it was returned on Pearl Harbor Day.49  The court reached its conclusion 
without a hearing because it reasoned that “people are never forthcoming with their 
prejudice.”50 
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered a new trial for an African-
American criminal defendant almost thirteen years51 after his conviction because a 
juror remained on the panel after the trial court learned he had told co-workers he 
intended to “get me a good rope so when we hang him, it won’t break.”52  The 
court deemed it presumptively prejudicial to allow the juror to stay on the panel 
because his views made him unfit to serve as a juror and could have tainted the rest 
of the jury.53  While the court would have preferred to conduct a hearing with juror 
testimony, it concluded that too much time had passed to ensure accurate 
recollections.54 
Social science research also suggests that racial prejudice remains a problem in 
deliberations, despite Tanner’s conclusion that Sixth Amendment rights are 
adequately protected by measures taken before the verdict is returned.  For 
example, one study compared challenge for cause procedures and concluded that 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 1033 (quoting anonymous juror letter). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1030. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Arterton, supra note 40, at 1030. 
 47. Turner v. Stime, No. 05-2-05374-1, 2008 WL 4375521 (Wash. Super. Ct., Mar. 27, 2008). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. State v. Loftin, 922 A.2d 1210, 1226 (N.J. 2007). 
 52. Id. at 1217. 
 53. Id. at 1226. 
 54. Id. 
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voir dire eliciting reflective responses, as opposed to closed-ended yes-or-no 
questioning, which is the norm in Maine,55 is more likely to reduce bias or 
prejudice.56  The study noted there may be little value to yes-or-no questions 
because recent research “suggests that such self-assessments may often be 
incorrect.”57  In particular, the study suggested it would be more useful to ask 
jurors “how race might impact” their decision-making because “it may make them 
aware of the general influences it can have and the extent to which it can influence 
decisions.”58  Another study also suggested that bias based on the defendant’s 
characteristics may influence jury decision-making.59  For example, the “study 
reveals clear evidence of bias against gay defendants in child sexual abuse cases, 
particularly when victims are boys.”60  The study showed that jurors were driven by 
moral outrage and anti-gay bias when they perceived the defendant to be gay and 
the victim to be straight.61  Similarly, another study suggests that non-evidentiary 
factors are more likely to influence jury verdicts in close cases.62  While jurors will 
typically rely on the evidence presented at trial when it clearly favors one side or 
the other, when the evidence is ambiguous jurors will be “liberated” from its 
constraints, which implies that verdicts are most “susceptible to non-evidentiary 
influences when the evidence is ‘close.’”63  The study did, however, note that more 
research is needed to fully understand how racial prejudice operates in this 
context.64 
Taken together, scholarship and case law suggest there are instances where 
racial prejudice does, at times, play a role in jury deliberations. Yet, there is 
significant disagreement over whether to allow defendants a means to gather 
evidence in support of a Sixth Amendment or corresponding state law violation.65  
Even if a remedy is theoretically available, it may become a nullity if Rule 606(b) 
is allowed to operate as a bar to gathering evidence in this limited instance.  
However, what remains to be seen is how the courts will respond. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON RACIAL PREJUDICE 
A.  Introduction to the Circuit Split 
Federal decisions on Rule 606(b) provide a reference point for understanding 
Maine’s rule for several reasons.  First, the language of the two rules is nearly 
                                                                                                     
 55. Alexander, supra note 24, at § 2-4 at 2-5. 
 56. Regina A. Schuller et al., The Impact of Prejudice Screening Procedures on Racial Bias in the 
Courtroom, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 320, 320 (2008). 
 57. Id. at 321. 
 58. Id. at 326. 
 59. Tisha R. A. Wiley & Bette L. Bottoms, Effects of Defendant Sexual Orientation on Jurors’ 
Perceptions of Child Sexual Assault, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 55 (2008).  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Dennis J. Devine et al., Strength of Evidence, Extraevidentiary Influence, and the Liberation 
Hypothesis: Data from the Field, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 136, 136 (2008).  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 147. 
 65. See supra Part I(B).  See infra Part II-III.  
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identical.66  Second, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has said “we should not 
plunge down doctrinal trails in disregard of the lessons of the federal experience.”67  
Third, the broader issue is the right to a fair trial, which is protected by both the 
Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 6 of the Maine Constitution.  
However, the apparent split between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits shows that 
the federal courts have little clarity or unanimity to offer on this issue and seem to 
disagree on the meaning of the rule and these cases.68  On one hand, the Tenth 
Circuit held that Rule 606(b) is a bar to all juror testimony, when the remedy 
implicates the verdict.69  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit argued in favor of 
allowing juror testimony of racial or ethnic prejudice to show juror dishonesty 
during voir dire and also reasoned that racial prejudice is a mental bias that is never 
appropriate during deliberations.70   
B.  The Tenth Circuit’s Opinion 
In response to allegations that jurors made racially prejudiced statements about 
Native Americans, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Benally, considered and 
rejected four arguments in support of admitting testimony of the jurors.71  First, the 
defendant argued that testimony of racial prejudice falls outside the scope of the 
rule because it was not offered to impeach the verdict, but rather to show a juror 
materially lied during voir dire.72  However, the court had said that the true purpose 
of the testimony was to support a motion for a new trial, which challenged the 
verdict’s validity.73  The court reasoned that “allowing juror testimony through the 
backdoor of a voir dire challenge risks swallowing the rule.”74  
Second, the court considered whether the juror testimony would fall within an 
exception to the rule.75  Treating extraneous prejudicial information and outside 
influences together as “extraneous influences,” the court pointed to several cases 
where juror misconduct—e.g., reading news reports, communication with third 
parties, bribes, and tampering—was considered to fall within an exception to the 
rule, which meant testimony was admissible.76  In contrast, the court considered 
                                                                                                     
 66. Compare FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (allowing jurors to testify to “whether there was a mistake in 
entering the verdict onto the verdict form”), with ME. R. EVID. 606(b) (omitting only this clause). 
 67. State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 803 (Me. 1983). 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006).  In Decoud, a three judge panel 
of the Ninth Circuit characterized Henley’s argument on racial prejudice as dicta, while the dissent 
forcefully disagreed with that characterization.  See generally id. at 1018 (citing United States v. 
Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001)).  Additionally, when serving on the Third Circuit, Justice 
Alito characterized Henley’s argument for admitting juror testimony to prove racial prejudice during 
deliberations as dicta.  Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Henley, 238 F.3d at 
1120).  
 69. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231. 
 70. Henley, 238 F.3d at 1119-20.  
 71. 546 F.3d at 1234-41. 
 72. Id. at 1235 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1236.  The court did say that juror testimony can be used for contempt proceedings against 
the dishonest juror, but that leaves the defendant without a remedy.  Id. at 1235 (citing Clark v. United 
States, 289 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1933)). 
 75. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1236. 
 76. Id. at 1236-37. 
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racial prejudice to be a personal experience that did not fall within an exception to 
the rule because personal experiences are not outside influences or extra-record 
facts about the defendant.77  While the court said the statements were certainly 
improper, they were not held to be extraneous.78  
Third, the court considered whether it should put a gloss on the rule to create 
an exception for evidence of racial prejudice or bias.79  However, the court claimed 
doing so would be the job of the legislature, not the courts, because “[o]ur 
commission is to apply the Rules of Evidence as written and interpreted to the case 
at hand.”80  Additionally, the court said implying “a broader exception would be 
inconsistent with congressional intent” because Congress had considered and 
rejected a version of the rule that might have allowed testimony in these 
instances.81   
Lastly, the court considered whether Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional as applied 
because it functioned as a bar to obtaining relief for what the defendant perceived 
as a Sixth Amendment violation.82  However, the court pointed to Tanner and 
contended it was sufficiently analogous to dispose of the issue.83  Essentially, the 
Benally court followed the Supreme Court’s lead and concluded that process values 
outweighed a defendant’s right to expose flawed deliberations.84  As a result, the 
court rejected the constitutional challenge to Rule 606(b).  Otherwise, the court 
said, “it is hard to see why, under this theory, Tanner should not have been decided 
the other way.”85 
C.  The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion 
In contrast to Benally, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Henley, 
persuasively argued that racial prejudice is a mental bias unrelated to the true issues 
of a case and, as a result, it should never be tolerated during deliberations.86  In 
Henley, allegations of racial prejudice and other juror misconduct surfaced a few 
days after the verdict, when two former jurors accused a third of saying “[t]he 
niggers are guilty.”87  Based on this information, the defendants, three of whom 
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were African American,88 filed a motion for a new trial.89  First, they contended 
that testimony of racial prejudice should be considered an extraneous influence, 
which is admissible under an exception to Rule 606(b).90  Alternatively, they 
argued even if the testimony is barred by Rule 606(b), it is admissible to prove that 
a juror lied materially during voir dire, which would be a sufficient ground to 
compel the court to grant a new trial.91 
Instead of simply relying on the “shibboleth” that jurors shall not testify to 
impeach their verdicts, the court engaged in doctrinal analysis and persuasively 
argued that juror testimony is admissible to prove racial prejudice tainted the 
process.92  Noting that many courts have hesitated to apply Rule 606(b) 
dogmatically in similar circumstances, the court said “a powerful case can be made 
that Rule 606(b) is wholly inapplicable to racial bias,” and that racial bias or 
prejudice did not need to be characterized as an extraneous influence in order to 
allow juror testimony.93  To reach this conclusion, the court coupled its premise 
that racial prejudice is a mental bias unrelated to the specific issues that a juror can 
legitimately be called on to determine94 with a Supreme Court opinion holding that 
jurors may testify about mental bias that is unrelated to the issues before the jury.95  
Further, the court pointed to Dobbs v. Zant, a district court opinion that 
distinguished Tanner based on its contention that “racial bias is not as observable 
as intoxication.”96  From there, the Henley Court identified a two-step process to 
use when determining whether racial prejudice pervaded jury deliberations.97  First, 
a trial court would have to hear the juror testimony.98  Second, the trial court would 
have to find prejudice to the defendant, and, in the Ninth Circuit, “[o]ne racist juror 
would be enough” to require a new trial.99 
However, the Henley Court ultimately remanded for findings on whether a 
juror may have lied during voir dire because the defendants would be entitled to a 
new trial if they could show that “a correct response would have provided a valid 
basis for a challenge for cause.”100  By stopping short of formally deciding 
“whether or to what extent the rule prohibits racial statements during deliberations 
or, as in this case, outside of deliberations but during the course of the trial,” the 
court avoided challenging the policy considerations of Rule 606(b).101 
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D.  Other Views  
Another view, suggested by Tobias v. Smith, would characterize evidence of 
racial prejudice as an outside influence that is admissible within an exception to 
Rule 606(b).102  In Tobias, after trial but before sentencing, the defendant moved to 
set aside the verdict or for a hearing based on a juror affidavit alleging, among 
other things, that the foreman told the jury a witness’s inability to identify the 
defendant from a photograph was irrelevant because “[y]ou can’t tell one black 
from another.  They all look alike.”103 The court reasoned that “the race of a 
defendant is an improper consideration for a jury, just as ethnic origin and religion 
are.”104  As a result, the court, sitting in habeas, ordered a hearing where the parties 
could question the jurors to clarify “whether statements occurred which created a 
probability of prejudice . . . or whether a juror was so biased as to be disqualified 
from serving on a jury.”105  
Nearly fifty years ago in State v. Levitt, New Jersey took a similar approach, 
concluding that religious prejudice by a jury during deliberations was an improper 
influence and grounds to overturn a verdict.106  In Levitt, one day after the verdict 
was returned, a juror telephoned the trial judge and, at a later meeting, told the 
judge that several discriminatory comments about the Jewish defendant and his 
religion prejudiced the deliberations.107  The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded 
that the trial judge “should investigate the truth of the charges” to consider whether 
a new trial is required.108  Acknowledging the “delicacy” of questioning jurors, the 
court said the proper practice was for a trial judge to take the testimony of jurors 
himself in the presence of counsel.109  If “even one juror was so biased as to 
prevent him or her from objectively weighing the evidence, it was sufficient to set 
the verdict aside.”110 
III.  MAINE’S UNSETTLED LAW 
A.  Introduction 
Like the federal courts, the state of the law in Maine is still unsettled on this 
issue.  It is, however, clear that trial courts have the authority during the trial and in 
some post-verdict instances to allow some types of juror testimony.111  From that 
starting point, several arguments will be considered here to address the problem of 
racial prejudice by jurors—both before and after a verdict.  The arguments are 
based upon the conclusion—drawn from notions of fairness as well as the cases 
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and available social science research—that racial prejudice is a pernicious 
influence that should be routed out whenever it is possible to do so.  Not only is 
racial prejudice harmful to individual defendants and the judicial system as a 
whole, but the cases outside of Maine show that some judges are struggling to find 
the right approach, given the existing framework of the rule.  
Further, the apparent disagreement among the federal courts increases the need 
for state action because no clear rule has emerged.  Fortunately, Maine courts have 
significantly more room to maneuver than their federal counterparts because Maine 
courts are not hampered by the same legislative history surrounding the enactment 
and amendment of the federal rules.112  As a result, Maine has an opportunity to 
guard jealously the rights of its citizens in an area where the federal government 
has yet to take decisive action or offer clear guidance.113  The task for the Maine 
bench and bar is clear: to ensure that criminal defendants have the opportunity to 
gather evidence in support of rights and remedies already in place, even in response 
to post-verdict allegations that racial prejudice animated jury deliberations. 
B.  Addressing the Problem Earlier in the Process 
As noted in Tanner, there are several places before the verdict where a 
criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial is protected—for example, voir dire, in-
court observation by the court, observations by other jurors, and post-verdict 
hearings with non-juror testimony.114  Each of these steps presents a procedural 
opportunity to weed out jurors who plainly hold racist views or, at least, to 
investigate whether a problem exists.  After pointing out those opportunities, I will 
present some of the arguments for and against doing so. 
1.  Voir Dire 
Voir dire, arguably, provides the earliest opportunity to determine whether 
prospective jurors harbor racist beliefs.  While attorneys may question prospective 
jurors, the nearly universal practice in Maine is for the court to conduct the initial 
examination of the venire panel to determine whether there is any prejudice that 
would prevent a prospective juror from being objective.115  Within this framework, 
there are at least three strategies that could be useful when there is a credible 
concern of racial prejudice.  First, as Judge Arterton has done, the court can 
broadly ask jurors whether they are able to decide the case without racial prejudice.  
Doing so would flag the issue for jurors, which could make them less tolerant of 
racial prejudice during deliberations.  It would also provide some jurors an 
opportunity to honestly answer they hold a prejudice.  However, there are valid 
criticisms of this practice.  As Judge Arterton noted, many jurors are unlikely to 
know themselves well enough to know their subconscious prejudices, or be honest 
about them.116  Additionally, flagging racial prejudice might alter the way 
deliberations function and drive prejudice further underground; however, this is a 
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risk already inherent in jury deliberations, and it seems likely that in the right case 
asking jurors this question could do more good than harm. Racial prejudice 
deprives defendants of fair trials.  Therefore, flagging racial prejudice during voir 
dire, where appropriate, would help to further the underlying purpose of 
questioning jurors: ensuring that the panel hearing the evidence is impartial. 
Second, while individual and small group voir dire is the exception, not the 
rule, in Maine,117 the trial court has broad discretion to question the venire panel as 
needed, especially when there are “unusually sensitive issues,”118 or there is “an 
unusual potential for prejudice.”119  This second strategy would be helpful for the 
implementing the third strategy, which would be to ask open-ended questions.  
Research has shown open-ended questions—which ask “how”, instead of just “yes 
or no”—tend to be more effective at exposing racial prejudice than traditional 
closed-ended questioning.120  However, weighing against these options are 
legitimate concerns about administrative efficiency, especially because individual 
voir dire and open-ended questioning would be time consuming.  Additionally, 
Justice Alexander, in his jury manual, cautioned against extending the selection 
process beyond a single day because it increases the risk that venire panel members 
may be exposed to pre-trial publicity.121  However, Justice Alexander also noted 
that the trial court has considerable discretion to balance “the competing 
considerations of fairness to the defendant, judicial economy, and avoidance of 
embarrassment to potential jurors.”122 
2.  During Trial 
Before the verdict is returned, the trial court has wide discretion to fashion a 
remedy to counter racial prejudice.123  Falling on a spectrum, the court can instruct 
or reprimand jurors, substitute an alternate juror, or declare a mistrial.  In general, 
however, if prejudice or misconduct is suspected, the trial court should interview 
the juror in question to determine whether he or she can remain impartial.124  The 
trial court’s determination of whether a juror is impartial will be reviewed 
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deferentially.125  If the trial judge concludes there is a “reasonable possibility of 
prejudice” it will trigger a presumption of prejudice, shifting to the state the burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that there is no prejudice.126 
3.  During Deliberations but Before Verdict 
It is possible for the court to provide a general instruction immediately before 
deliberations begin that would remind jurors to consider only the facts, not to insert 
personal prejudices.  Flagging racial prejudice could make jurors aware that it is a 
form of misconduct that is not allowed and that should be reported to the judge.  If 
a trial judge does learn of prejudice, there are several remedial options available, 
such as examining the jury, providing another instruction, replacing a juror, or even 
declaring a mistrial. 
While the policy considerations of Rule 606(b) should be considered at all 
times, a strong argument can be made that the text of the rule would not apply 
before a verdict is reached; therefore, juror testimony would be admissible because 
it would not attack the validity of a verdict.127  Maine’s pattern jury instructions 
already tell jurors to engage in an “impartial consideration of the evidence” with an 
“open mind.”128  In the right case, it would only be an incremental step to extend 
those instructions by telling jurors to avoid racial prejudice and to decide the case 
solely on the facts in evidence.  Of course, it is possible to criticize this suggestion 
out of concern that such an instruction might have a chilling effect on deliberations 
or send bias and prejudice underground.  However, as the Law Court has 
previously said, “If during the progress of a trial it shall become known to the court 
that some of the jury do not stand indifferent, whether toward the state or the 
accused, it would be a travesty on the administration of justice if the trial must 
proceed.”129 
C.  Arguments for Allowing Post-Verdict Juror Testimony of Racial Prejudice 
The challenge for defendants is marshalling legal support for the admission of 
juror testimony to prove racial prejudice tainted deliberations.  There are four key 
arguments that will be explored here: (1) racial prejudice is misconduct outside the 
scope of Rule 606(b) and, therefore, does not implicate the verdict; (2) racial 
prejudice raises constitutional problems to which Rule 606(b) must give way; (3) 
racial prejudice is an outside influence and is admissible under an exception to the 
rule; and (4) testimony of racial prejudice might be admissible to prove a juror lied 
materially during voir dire.  While the arguments presented here will not answer all 
possible criticisms, they will attempt to chart a defensible position. 
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1.  Racial Prejudice Is Misconduct Outside the Scope of Rule 606(b) 
A policy argument can be made that the Law Court should consider racial 
prejudice to be severe misconduct that would take supporting testimony outside the 
scope of Rule 606(b).  Because juror testimony would uncover this misconduct, it 
does not impeach the verdict itself and instead reveals gross misconduct.  Three 
policies supporting Rule 606(b) are relevant here: (1) protecting the jury’s thought 
process to “insulate jury value judgments from judicial scrutiny,” (2) finality, and 
(3) certainty, which should be promoted to ensure that scarce judicial resources are 
not wasted.130  However, a leading treatise on federal practice has argued that these 
policy goals cannot be considered absolute.131  “Privacy is abandoned when jury 
value judgments are not in jeopardy or embrace values that are simply beyond the 
pale, such as racial discrimination.”132  While one of the great purposes of juries is 
to “control the biases of the government reflected in the law and by the judge, they 
also bring their own biases into the courtroom.”133 Even when those biases 
accurately reflect the values of the community, it is less desirable to protect them 
because “majority rule itself can produce oppression when the majority uses its 
values to demean the rights of minorities.”134  When the “jury supplants the judge 
as the source of oppression . . . for example, where a verdict is animated by racial 
prejudice, it may make sense from a policy standpoint to invade jury privacy to 
expose such abuse.”135  
It is difficult to find textual support for this argument because juror testimony 
could reveal statements made during deliberations that influenced whether jurors 
assented to the verdict.136  However, in most instances, testimony could be limited 
to the objectively verifiable fact of whether the statement was made, as opposed to 
the subjective effect it had on the minds of jurors.  From there, the Law Court could 
develop standards to consider whether specific statements are prejudicial, in a 
similar fashion to how the court handles extraneous information, which is subject 
to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.137 
2.  Constitutional Concerns Trump Rule 606(b)’s Policies 
In Maine, the right to a fair trial is protected by article 1, section 6 of our state 
constitution, as well as by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.138  The right to “an impartial trial 
encompasses the right to be tried by an impartial jury,”139 and justice requires that 
verdicts be the result of “honest deliberations absolutely free from prejudice or 
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bias.”140  As mentioned above, the Law Court has also said that “it would be a 
travesty on the administration of justice” if a defendant had a trial by a partial or 
biased jury.141  For a verdict to be void, the jury does not need to be actually 
biased, “[i]f [bias] may have affected their ability to render an impartial verdict, it 
is sufficient.”142  As a signal of how highly the Law Court values this right, it “will 
go beyond the technicalities of appellate review to ensure compliance with the 
guaranty of an impartial trial.”143 
As a result, a strong argument can be made that Rule 606(b) must yield to the 
constitutional provisions protecting a fair trial, at least in some instances.  
“Eradication of the evil of state supported racial prejudice is at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” which “suggests that the constitutional interests of the 
effected party are at their strongest when a jury employs racial bias in reaching its 
verdict.”144  Correspondingly, the policy interests supporting Rule 606(b) would be 
weakest in these instances.145  That is because prejudice “undermines the jury’s 
ability to . . . function as a buffer against governmental oppression and, in fact, 
converts the jury itself into an instrument of oppression.”146 
Critics of this argument could turn to the 10th Circuit’s decision in Benally, 
which argued that concluding Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional as applied would 
force the court to engage in difficult line-drawing about juror misconduct and that 
it would also be “hard to see why, under this theory, Tanner should not have been 
decided the other way.”147  However, there are three responses to Benally.  First, 
Tanner may have been wrongly decided.  For example, Justice O’Connor cited 
Wigmore to show that the general rule flatly bars juror testimony, yet Wigmore 
thought that juror intoxication was an exception to the rule that required juror 
testimony.148  Second, racial prejudice is distinguishable from intoxication because 
the other procedural protections of the right to a fair trial–voir dire, observation 
during trial by the court and other jurors, and a post-trial hearing based on non-
juror testimony–are less useful at routing out racial prejudice because it is difficult 
to observe and detect.149  In fact, it may be that the only way to learn about racial 
prejudice is from juror testimony.  Third, while the Tanner court thought process 
values outweighed the rights of individual defendants, it appears that the 
assumptions underlying that conclusion have proven to be wrong.  Massachusetts, 
Washington State, New Jersey and several federal courts have all allowed juror 
testimony to prove racial prejudice during deliberations without any apparent ill 
effect.150  As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said, to ignore evidence of 
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racial prejudice “might well offend fundamental fairness.”151  From there, it is a 
small step to conclude that the “‘right to use juror evidence necessarily implies a 
method to gather that evidence,’” and that judges are able to supervise inquiries of 
jurors.152  
3.  Racial Prejudice Can Be Characterized as an Outside Influence 
The text of Rule 606(b) specifically allows juror testimony to show “whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention 
or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any 
juror.”153  In what appears to be an effort to avoid the constitutional arguments, 
some courts and scholars have argued that racial prejudice could be considered an 
outside influence, placing it squarely within one of the textual exceptions to the 
rule.154  The obvious advantage to doing so is that it avoids the need to create an 
exception by way of judicial gloss, or to challenge the constitutionality of the rule 
as applied.  However, it seems unlikely that a court would reach this conclusion 
unless it found racial prejudice repugnant to fundamental fairness. In that case, it 
makes little sense to apply strained readings to words like “outside” and 
“influence,” when it may be more sound analytically to ground a decision to admit 
juror testimony on fundamental fairness or the right to a fair trial.  That being said, 
it is worth exploring the grist of this argument because it is entirely possible that it 
could be the most successful for the very reason that it avoids a constitutional 
problem. 
The first step in the analysis requires classifying statements of racial prejudice 
as an “outside influence.”  Before the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, the Law 
Court said “[a] juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the 
existence of the disturbing influence, but he cannot be permitted to testify how far 
that influence operated upon his mind.”155  That same basic premise seems to be 
encapsulated in Rule 606(b).156  The Law Court has defined extraneous information 
as “information introduced to the jury from outside the normal deliberative 
process.”157  By way of example, the Law Court has held the following to be 
extraneous: information from a coworker who knew a defendant, a dictionary, a 
real estate appraisal book, a pamphlet with evidence from a former trial between 
the parties, and all information from jurors’ own investigations.158  In contrast, the 
Law Court has said that “[i]nformation communicated among jurors during the 
deliberation process, however, is not considered to be extraneous, and may not be 
                                                                                                     
 151. Tavares, 430 N.E.2d at 1208 n.25 (Mass. 1982) (quoting Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 
490 (S.D. Iowa 1978)). 
 152. Id. at 1207 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fidler, 385 N.E.2d 513 (Mass. 1979)). 
 153. M.R. EVID. 606(b). 
 154. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 127, at § 6075. Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify that a 
Verdict was the Product of Racial Bias, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 142-43 (1993); Tobias, 
468 F. Supp. 1287. 
 155. Driscoll v. Gatcomb, 112 Me. 289, 290, 92 A. 39, 39 (Me. 1914).  
 156. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 606. 
 157. State v. Fuller, 660 A.2d 915, 917 (Me. 1994). 
 158. Id. at 917-18 (internal citations omitted). 
2010] JUROR PREJUDICE 345 
inquired into even if the information is improper.”159 
The Law Court’s approach characterizes “outside” based on legal, rather than 
spatial, notions, which is a view explored by a leading treatise, Federal Practice 
and Procedure, as well as supported by one of the treatise’s current authors, 
Professor Victor Gold.160  Professor Gold wrote that “bias might be considered an 
outside influence if what is meant by that term is an influence on the verdict 
‘outside’ of the record and the parameters of constitutionally acceptable values 
which the jury may use in its deliberations.”161  As a result, outside “can be 
understood in a legal sense, referring to those influences that the law deems to be 
an improper basis for decisionmaking,” as opposed to a view of “outside” that is 
spatial, which would not permit juror testimony of racial prejudice, or even reading 
a newspaper in the jury room, because it “originates within the jury.”162  Using a 
spatial notion of “outside influence” allows the jury, which is supposed to be a 
democratic institution, to become a vehicle for oppression.163  Well before the 
exception for outside influences was codified in Rule 606(b), the Law Court 
allowed juror testimony of a “disturbing influence,” and it is difficult to think of an 
influence that is disturbing that would not also be outside the boundary of legally 
permissible conduct.164  While the Law Court has, however, protected juror 
discussions of “personal information,” racial prejudice is arguably different from 
information.165  The word “information” has a factual, newsy, or knowledge-based 
definition.166   In contrast, racial discrimination and bias encompasses decisions or 
actions based on the assumption that race is a determining factor of behavior.167  
Once a criminal defendant proves a juror was exposed to an outside influence, 
“a presumption of prejudice is established, which then shifts the burden to the State 
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the information did not 
prejudice the case.”168 This is a high burden for the state, but one that makes sense 
in this context given the state’s goal of pursuing justice.  Because Rule 606(b) and 
Maine case law would bar an inquiry into the effect of any outside influence on a 
juror’s mind, the court’s task is really to determine whether racially discriminatory 
statements were made and, if so, they would be prejudicial.169 
Some courts have already labeled racial prejudice as an outside influence.170  
For example, in Tobias v. Smith, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of New York ordered a hearing and questioning of jurors based on 
allegations in a juror affidavit that other jurors made racially prejudiced statements 
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during deliberations.171  The court reached this conclusion after reviewing a juror 
affidavit that attributed to a white juror the statement that it was irrelevant that 
witnesses could not identify a photograph of the defendant because “[y]ou can’t tell 
one black from another.  They all look alike.”172  Further, the juror alleged that 
another juror said the panel should credit “two white victims as opposed to this 
black defendant.”173  The court reasoned that a hearing was needed because the 
allegations in the affidavit were “sufficient to raise a question as to whether the 
jury’s verdict was discolored by improper influences and that they are not merely 
matters of jury deliberations.”174  The heart of the court’s conclusion rested on the 
premise that “[t]here should be no injection of race into jury deliberations and 
jurors who manifest racial prejudice have no place in the jury room.”175  
4.  Juror Testimony Is Admissible to Prove a Juror Lied During Voir Dire 
The Law Court has said that a post-trial hearing is the appropriate forum to 
explore the accuracy of a juror’s voir dire response and whether there was any 
potential bias.176  To obtain a new trial on these grounds, a litigant would have to 
show that “(i) the juror failed to honestly or correctly answer a material question, 
and (ii) a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 
cause.”177  The trial court will only order a new trial if “the nondisclosure prevented 
the discovery of juror bias as probably, not speculatively existent.”178  However, 
counsel must exercise “due diligence” during voir dire, which means the parties 
cannot raise on appeal an error that could have been corrected earlier in the 
process.179  Practically, for counsel, that means asking “specific questions during 
voir dire designed to elicit the concealed information from the prospective juror,” 
and notifying the court immediately “of any evidence they have, or should have, 
concerning the validity of the juror’s responses.”180 
Two recent Maine cases demonstrate the Law Court’s approach to a motion for 
a new trial based on allegations that jurors lied or were less than accurate during 
voir dire.  In State v. Chesnel, the Law Court held that silence in the face of vague 
voir dire questions is insufficient to show a juror failed to answer a material 
question, when the only evidence to show the juror lied was gathered in a post-
verdict investigation overseen by the defendant’s lawyer.181  Citing Rule 606(b) as 
a bar to juror testimony, the trial court denied the defendant’s request to allow 
jurors to testify in support of the investigator’s affidavit.182  The Law Court 
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rebuked the trial court, saying not only that Rule 606(b) allows a post-verdict 
hearing in this instance, but also that it is the “appropriate forum in which the 
accuracy of a juror’s voir dire response and potential bias can be explored.”183  
However, because defense counsel had not joined a later request by the state to stay 
the appeal for an evidentiary hearing, the Law Court concluded that the evidence 
before it was insufficient to show a “nonanswer” was in fact evidence of a 
“dishonest or incorrect” answer.184  While lawyers are ethically obligated to report 
any juror misconduct that comes to their attention,185 the Law Court’s decision 
seems to be influenced by its view that post-verdict investigations are generally 
disfavored because they may frighten jurors and induce answers that are less than 
truthful.186 
In State v. Watts, the Law Court held a juror did not engage in misconduct by 
failing to disclose an uncomfortable prior sexual experience that she later relayed to 
the jury during deliberations in a sexual assault case.187  As is typical in a sexual 
assault case, the venire panel had to complete a confidential questionnaire in an 
attempt to screen out jurors who might have difficulty remaining impartial.188  The 
parties agreed in advance that a “yes” answer to any of the questions189 would 
automatically disqualify any juror from serving on the panel.190  At a post-verdict 
hearing, a juror said that she recounted to the jury an uncomfortable sexual 
experience that required medical treatment, but that she had neither thought of it 
until deliberations, nor considered herself to be a sexual assault victim.191  Based on 
this evidence, among other things, the trial court granted a motion for a new trial, 
which the Law Court reversed.192  The Law Court reasoned that the juror never 
considered herself to be a victim of sexual assault or sexual abuse, which was the 
focus of one voir dire question, and that the defendant’s lawyer had “repeatedly 
implored the members of the jury to call on their own sexual experiences in 
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assessing the credibility of the witnesses.”193  As a result, the Law Court concluded 
the trial judge “misapprehended the meaning of the evidence,” especially 
considering that the juror’s answers during voir dire were given before she knew 
about the facts of the case and before defense counsel implored the jurors to “view 
the evidence from the perspective of their own sexual experiences.”194 
There are a few lessons to be learned for trial counsel.  First, it is possible to 
make an argument that a juror lied during voir dire, but questions during voir dire 
must be specific, and silence alone may not be enough to show a juror withheld 
information or lied materially.  Second, counsel should strongly consider asking 
specific questions during voir dire to avoid the problems faced by the defendant in 
Chesnel.  Third, the context in which the questions are asked will prove to be very 
significant.  It is worth noting that in Watts, the Law Court may have been reluctant 
to uphold the trial court’s ruling, in part because doing so would have essentially 
characterized the juror’s prior sexual experience as an assault, which is something 
the juror herself had not done. 
IV.  A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 606(b) 
Outside of Maine, courts dealing with allegations of racial prejudice during 
deliberations have struggled to accommodate the competing policies of Rule 
606(b).  Yet, the results so far have been mixed.  Some courts have barred the 
evidence, while others have endeavored to strain words like “outside” and 
“influence,” to try to make the text of the rule accommodate our understood notions 
of fairness.  
However, here in Maine, a better approach would be to amend the text of the 
rule.  Doing so would provide clear guidance to the courts and an opportunity to 
consider this issue with an eye to the future.  Amending the rule as proposed here 
would place this issue where it belongs—in the discretion of the trial court to 
determine, at least as an initial matter, whether racist comments prejudiced the 
defendant.  The addition of an advisory comment could offer initial guidance to the 
bench and bar, and over time the Law Court could develop standards on a case-by-
case basis.   
A proposed amendment to the rule could read: 
(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment.  Upon an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 
statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon that juror’s or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the 
juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning any 
juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on 
(1) the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury’s attention, or  (2) whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether jurors made statements 
of racial prejudice.  Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the 
juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from 
testifying be received. 
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Doing so would eliminate many of the problems discussed above.  In 
particular, it would avoid any constitutional challenges to the rule or need for the 
courts to put a gloss on the rule.  It would also avoid the need for a strained reading 
of “outside influence.”  Lastly, it would also avoid the need for a back-door 
entrance to a motion for a new trial by trying to prove a juror lied materially during 
voir dire, which functionally challenges the validity of a verdict, even if that is not 
the explicit intention.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that racial prejudice taints some jury deliberations.  As a 
result, it seems reasonable to conclude that this issue will eventually surface here in 
Maine.  Considering the four arguments presented in support of juror testimony, it 
seems fairly unlikely that a court would be persuaded by them unless it first 
reached the conclusion that racial prejudice has no place in deliberations.  Two 
arguments acknowledge this directly, and the Law Court would benefit from 
considering them.  First, the court may want to hold that racial prejudice is a mental 
bias and misconduct, allowing testimony as a gloss on the rule.  Second, the court 
might want to consider that Rule 606(b) could be unconstitutional in some 
instances.  While these arguments address the issue directly, the first is better than 
the second because it provides a basis for a decision that does not require a direct 
challenge to the constitutionality of the rule. 
However, a better approach would be for the advisory committee to amend 
Rule 606(b), so that the trial courts have a textual basis to rely on when considering 
the admissibility of post-verdict juror testimony that would prove racial prejudice 
animated deliberations.  From there, the courts could develop standards for 
different types of comments to determine whether they should be deemed 
presumptively prejudicial, subject to a rebuttable presumption, or whether another 
standard is best.  While there are certainly strong arguments in favor of absolute 
secrecy of deliberations, it seems clear that the fears of Justice O’Connor in Tanner 
are unfounded based on the examples of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
Washington State.  In all three states, juror evidence is allowed to show racial 
prejudice during deliberations without any apparent ill effect. 
Rule 606 serves a valuable purpose and should not be discarded because it 
protects the integrity of the jury process. However, racial prejudice during 
deliberations presents an instance when the rule must yield to notions of fairness. 
To conclude otherwise would leave hollow the right to a fair trial by denying 
defendants the only viable way to gather evidence to prove racial prejudice tainted 
jury deliberations. 
